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 FSAPs are designed to assess the stability of the financial system as a whole and not that of 
individual institutions. They have been developed to help countries identify and remedy 
weaknesses in their financial sector structure, thereby, enhancing their resilience to 
macroeconomic shocks and cross-border contagion. FSAPs do not cover risks that are specific to 
individual institutions such as asset quality, operational or legal risks, or fraud. 
  Korea is deemed by the Fund to have a systemically important financial sector according to 
SM/10/235 (9/16/2010), and the stability assessment under this FSAP is part of bilateral 
surveillance under Article IV of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. 
 This report was prepared by Ghiath Shabsigh and members of the FSAP mission. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Korean economy is experiencing a modest recovery, helped by supportive monetary and 
fiscal policies and buoyant exports. GDP growth is expected to rebound to 2.8 percent in 2013 
(from 2 percent in 2012), and strengthen further to 3.7 percent in 2014, in view of the projected 
global recovery and a gradual pickup in domestic demand. Inflation has fallen to 0.7 percent in 
October 2013 from 4.2 percent in 2011, well below the target band of 2½–3½ percent. With 
stronger exports and muted domestic demand, the current account surplus has widened and is 
expected to reach around 5.5 percent of GDP in 2013, putting an upward pressure on the exchange 
rate. However, risks are on the downside. The main near-term risks are external: sharply slower 
growth in Korea’s main trading partners or severe global financial market stress.  
While the vulnerability of the Korean financial system has diminished considerably since the 
2008 crisis, risks remain. The capitalization of the banking sector has improved, foreign currency 
liquidity profiles have strengthened markedly, and the active disposal of bad assets has resulted in 
low levels of nonperforming loans. However, profitability has remained weak, and while banks’ 
vulnerabilities to corporate and household exposures appear contained in the near term, further 
economic weakness could impair the soundness of both sectors. Although macroprudential policies 
slowed the growth of banks’ lending to households, this has spurred household exposures to less 
regulated nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs).  
The banking system appears resilient to extreme growth shocks or protracted sluggish 
movement of the economy, but nonbank depository institutions (NBDIs) are more vulnerable. 
Banking capital adequacy ratios remain at about or above 10 percent even under the most severe 
stress test scenario. Banks’ foreign currency liquidity positions are robust; only under a very severe 
scenario the system would face a small but manageable liquidity shortage. However, stress tests 
reveal that some NBDIs have thin buffers against credit risk. A regulatory framework consistent with 
that for banks should be applied to all NBDIs, with larger entities also subjected to stricter 
supervision. 
Korea has been effective in articulating and applying macroprudential policies, but would 
benefit from the establishment of a macroprudential council. A high degree of capital account 
openness and an increasing degree of financial integration, coupled with greater sophistication of 
the financial sector and the potential for regulatory arbitrage will require an enhanced ability to 
detect emerging systemic risks and to initiate timely responses. This argues for establishing more 
formal and dedicated arrangements for macroprudential policy. Such arrangements can provide for 
enhanced transparency and accountability, a greater degree of independence from the political 
process, a clarification and strengthening of the role of the BOK in financial stability, and a 
separation of the macroprudential policy function from crisis management. 
There would be merit also in establishing a dedicated apex committee for leading and 
coordinating crisis preparedness and crisis management. The authorities should undertake 
periodic crisis simulation exercises; strengthen the ability of the deposit insurance and resolution 
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authority to play a more effective role, and bring the financial institutions resolution framework in 
line with international best practice, in particular regarding financial conglomerates and systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs). 
Building upon the 2003 FSAP recommendations, the authorities have taken resolute steps to 
strengthen the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The assessments of standards 
and codes identified gaps that need to be addressed, with issues related to governance, mandate, 
and risk-sensitive approaches being overarching concerns that could undermine supervisory 
effectiveness. Additional efforts are needed to update the regulations including with respect to 
financial conglomerates and NBFIs. The legal framework provides solid foundation for financial 
sector oversight but gaps need to be addressed, in particular, the narrow range and level of 
pecuniary administrative sanctions in comparison to a prosecution-centric focus at present.  
The regulatory architecture raises a number of concerns. These pertain, in particular, to its 
independence from political influence or the perception of it, multiple objectives that dilute the 
focus on the core supervisory mandate, and overlapping responsibilities and complex processes 
requiring intense inter-agency communication. Therefore, there is a need to further strengthen the 
independence of the FSC and FSS from the political process to facilitate greater focus on promoting 
the safety and soundness of the financial sector and sound supervisory and enforcement decisions.  
The Korean authorities have undertaken various initiatives with respect to AML/CFT. The key 
shortcomings to date are: (i) lack of a sound and effective risk-based approach to AML/CFT 
supervision; (ii) slow progress in amending the legal framework; and (iii) absence of supervision for a 
subset of deposit-taking institutions. 
The BOK has significant capacity to respond to foreign and domestic currency liquidity 
pressures although tensions may arise in times of heightened stress. High levels of Korean won 
(KRW) liquidity provide participants confidence in financing longer term assets from short-term 
funding markets. However, thin secondary markets for fixed-income securities is a weakness at times 
of stress, implying a prominent BOK role to backstop markets. The systemic liquidity framework will 
benefit from measures to support secondary markets development, and the BOK should ensure its 
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) framework is robust and understood by stakeholders. 
Korea has a well-developed payment, clearing, and settlement infrastructure, but there’s 
room to increase compliance with international standards. Enhanced cooperation between the 
BOK and the FSC regarding the regulation, supervision, and oversight of the financial markets 
infrastructures (FMIs) is desirable. The authorities should also develop a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) to ensure effective coordination between the BOK and FSC covering both the 
appropriate technical and management levels within the authorities. They should also develop and 
test a crisis management plan. To further improve the FMIs regulatory structure, the powers of the 
BOK and the resources of the FSC should be increased.  
High priority recommendations are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Korea: Financial Stability Assessment Program Update—High Priority Recommendations 
Recommendations Timing 
Overall Financial Sector Oversight and Coordination
Establish a dedicated and formal macroprudential council, with a stronger role for the BOK, the power 
to recommend regulatory action from other bodies, and transparency over policy deliberations. 
Medium-term 
Strengthen the independence of the FSC and FSS and increase transparency of the allocation of 
decision-making responsibilities among the two authorities. 
Short to 
Medium-term 
Enhance enforcement effectiveness by broadening the range of administrative and civil penalties and 
increasing the amount of administrative fines and civil penalties. 
Medium-term
Financial Stability Analysis, Stress Tests, and Financial Supervision
Enhance coordination among agencies involved in stress testing (FSS and BOK). Short-term
FSS should carry out a comprehensive validation of banks’ stress testing exercise. Short-term 
Disclose to the public the results of the stress tests conducted by the authorities. Short-Term
Empower supervisors to set capital ratios above the Basel II minimum, implement all principles of 
Pillar-2 of Basel II, and extend calculation of Basel II capital to group holding companies. 
Short-term 
Apply regulatory framework consistent with that for banks to all NBDIs, with larger entities also 
subjected to stricter supervision. 
Short-term 
Implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision, and expand supervisory activities to all 
deposit-taking institutions, and the designated non-financial businesses and professions. 
Short-term 
Ensure sufficiently comprehensive audit oversight and introduce minimum standards for appointing 
external auditors of banks over and above existing requirements, reflecting expectations of experience 
and expertise.  
Medium-term 
Enhance risk-sensitivity of supervision via more flexible and frequent examinations that also provide 
sufficient coverage of the smaller supervised entities and enhancement to the judgmental component 
of the assessments. 
Medium-term 
Crisis Preparedness and Crisis Management Framework
Establish a dedicated apex committee for leading and coordinating crisis preparedness and 
management work; undertake periodic crisis simulation exercises. 
Short-term
Replenish the deficit in deposit insurance fund; assure KDIC back-up funding. Short-term
Address potential moral hazard risks by enhancing banks’ risk management; and ensuring that 
government support is not assured or open-ended.  
Medium-term
Systemic Liquidity Management and Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs)
BOK to ensure that its crisis management contingency plan adequately covers ELA-related decisions. 
Put in place a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure effective coordination between BOK and FSC 
in FMI matters, and provide BOK with more enforcement tools. 
Short-term
Short-term 
Reform the credit risk and management framework for the securities market, and increase the number 
of KRX staff managing companywide and CCP-related matters. 
Short-term
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A.   Macroeconomic Outlook and Micro-Financial Linkages 
1.      After significant slowdown in 2012, Korea’s growth strengthened over the course of 
2013 (Appendix Table 1), with exports rebounding strongly and private consumption and 
construction strengthening, due in part to a pickup in wage growth and policies to reinvigorate the 
housing market. Growth is projected to rise to 2.8 percent in 2013 and to further strenghen to 
3.7 percent in 2014. Inflation has been subdued, due to the absence of demand pressures and 
moderating commodity and food prices, falling from 4.2 percent in 2011 to 0.7 percent in 
October 2013 (end of period), well below the target band of 2½–3½ percent.  
2.      Against this background, the Korean authorities’ response has been timely and 
measured. The government issued a supplementary budget in April 2013 (of 1¼ percent of GDP) to 
make up for a potential revenue shortfall and provide modest stimulus. The fiscal deficit (excluding 
social security funds) is projected to widen to around 2.1 percent of GDP in 2013. The previously 
committed fiscal consolidation path has also been delayed in view of the prevailing negative output 
gap. The BOK cut the policy rate by 25 bps in May 2013 to 2.5 percent, after pausing since October 
2012. In addition, in April 2013, the government launched a comprehensive policy package to 
stimulate the property market. The key short-term risks to the outlook are an abrupt and premature 
exit from quantitative easing in the United States, a re-intensification of the euro area crisis, and a 
deeper-than-expected slowdown in emerging markets, particularly China. 
3.      Korea was affected only mildly by the recent global market turmoil, and has been even 
viewed as a safe haven. After a short-lived fall in the won, Korea proved resilient to the large capital 
outflows and sharp currency depreciations that affected the rest of the region following the 
announcement of the eventual tapering of U.S. unconventional monetary policy (UMP) in May. 
Despite tighter global conditions, Korean bond yields have risen only modestly and the Korean won 
and stock market have actually been appreciating. Korea’s resilience to capital outflows relative to 
other economies reflects strong fundamentals, particularly reduced short-term external debt, low 
inflation and public debt, and rebounding growth. Notwithstanding this resilience, Korea’s 
susceptibility to capital flow volatility remains a key concern for policymakers, and measures have 
been taken to mitigate this volatility (see below). 
B.   Financial Crisis and Policy Response 
4.      Prompt policy actions by the Korean authorities supported a relatively rapid recovery 
of the financial sector and the broader economy after the 2008 crisis (Box 1). With the seizure 
of international money markets following the Lehman Brothers collapse, Korean banks faced a sharp 
reduction in their credit lines and found it difficult to roll over their short-term external borrowings.1 
                                                   
1 Net capital outflows amounted to 4½ percent of annualized GDP in the fourth quarter of 2008, compared to about 
3¾ percent of annualized GDP in the fourth quarter of 1997 during the Asian financial crisis. 
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The shortage of dollar funding spilled over into domestic money markets, and the perceived default 
risk of Korean banks, due to their significant reliance on wholesale funding, increased by more than 
anywhere else in the region. However, despite a severe and sudden reversal of capital flows, prompt 
policy measures supported the stability of the financial sector and ensured that the flow of credit to 
the economy was not disrupted. 
Box 1. Global Financial Crisis: Korea’s Stabilization Policy Measures 
The authorities implemented a broad set of measures to counteract financial stability pressures, in particular 
to address concerns about the dry-out of FX and won liquidity, and preempt capitalization pressures on banks 
and ensure the flow of credit to the economy. Most of them, except for SME support, have now been phased 
out: 
 Providing generous liquidity support in both won and U.S. dollar. The BOK broadened the list of 
eligible counterparties and collateral in its won repo operations and supplied liquidity of 
KRW16.8 trillion through long-term repos. It also set aside KRW 5 trillion (KRW 2.1 trillion were used) 
to purchase corporate bonds and CPs under the Bond Market Stabilization Fund. Regarding dollar 
liquidity, the BOK used foreign reserves and entered into currency swap deals with major central 
banks to provide up to US$56 billion to banks and trade-related businesses. 
 Guaranteeing banks’ external debt. The government guaranteed banks’ foreign debt in 2009, even 
though the scale of use was limited. By end-2009, several banks were able to access international 
capital markets without recourse to the government’s guarantee. 
 Establishing recapitalization and restructuring funds. In December 2008 a Bank Recapitalization Fund 
of up to KRW 20 trillion was set up to strengthen banks’ capital base; a one-time injection of 
KRW 4 trillion into eight banks was carried out in March 2009. The Fund was used on a temporary, 
countercyclical basis during the crisis to avert potential moral hazard. The Korea Asset Management 
Corporation (KAMCO) stood ready to issue up to KRW 40 trillion government-backed bonds to 
purchase corporate nonperforming loans (NPLs) from financial institutions (only a fraction was used). 
 Ensuring SMEs’ access to credit. The amount of SME credit guarantees was raised and its coverage 
increased up to 100 percent; banks were guided to roll over SME loans falling due in 2009. 
Subsidized lending facilities for SMEs were also expanded, with the BOK raising the Aggregate Credit 
Ceiling by KRW 3.5 trillion to KRW 10 trillion.  
 Actively using macroprudential tools to contain systemic liquidity risks in the banking sector. This was 
a response to Korean banks’ significant reliance on wholesale funding and short-term external debt. 
 
5.      The comprehensive policy responses supported the stability in the financial sector, and 
positive credit growth to the real economy. The interbank market was stabilized quickly after a 
roughly 150 basis point spike in interbank market spreads in December 2008. With banks able to 
fund themselves, private domestic credit continued to grow healthily in Korea. 
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SOUNDNESS OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND 
POTENTIAL RISKS 
A.   Overview of the Financial Sector 
6.      Korea’s financial sector is large and diversified (Appendix Table 2). The total assets of 
the sector amounted to 312 percent of GDP at end-2012. The banking sector, comprising 
commercial and specialized banks, and two foreign banks, accounted for 48 percent of aggregate 
financial sector assets at end-2012, with lending constituting 73 percent of commercial banks’ total 
assets (above the average for the advanced Asian countries). The nonbank sector has experienced 
strong growth in recent years, with its share in total financial sector assets rising to 52 percent at 
end-2012 from 41 percent at end-2000. The nonbanking sector comprises a wide range of deposit- 
and non deposit-taking institutions. The former includes credit cooperatives, accounting for about 
11 percent of aggregate financial sector assets at end-2012. Non-deposit-taking institutions mainly 
comprise insurance companies, asset management companies, and securities companies, 
respectively accounting for 19 percent, 8 percent, and 7 percent of aggregate financial sector assets, 
respectively. 
7.      The authorities have been fostering the development of financial holding companies 
(FHCs). FHCs are seen to hold potential benefits as they permit local financial institutions to pursue 
economies of scale and scope. Regulations stance seek to minimize potential FHC-related 
vulnerabilities, such as by prohibiting FHCs to control nonfinancial subsidiaries. As of end-2012, 
there were 12 FHCs in Korea: 10 bank and 2 nonbank holding companies. 
8.      Korea has a sizeable local capital markets. The bond market is among the largest in Asia, 
with outstanding securities accounting for 123 percent of GDP at end-2012. Growth in the market is 
driven by the corporate bond segment, one of the largest in the world.2 The derivatives market is 
also large, with trading activity concentrated in exchange-traded derivatives. Daily turnover of 
equity-linked derivatives at the Korea Exchange was the second highest globally, only behind the 
CME. There is also active trading of foreign exchange (FX) and interest rate derivatives. 
B.   Financial Sector Vulnerabilities 
9.      Financial sector vulnerabilities have diminished considerably since the 2008 crisis as a 
result of policy actions to strengthen banks’ solvency and liquidity in the aftermath of the 
crisis. Banks’ liquidity profiles have improved markedly, reflecting lower FX liquidity mismatches and 
less reliance on wholesale funding (Appendix Figure 1). Banks’ capitalization has been bolstered via 
                                                   
2 In Korea, outstanding domestic debt securities amounted to 43 percent of GDP for corporate issuers and 
32 percent of GDP for financial institutions at end-2012, placing Korea among the largest corporate bond market in 
percent of GDP. Consequently, intermediation by the domestic banking system in Korea is relatively less important 
compared to other Asian countries. 
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post-crisis measures (Box 1), and by supervisory guidance to limit dividend payouts. As a result the 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of the banking system at end-2012 reached 14.3 percent from 
12.3 percent at end-2008. 
10.      The exposure of the Korean financial system to intensification of risks in global 
financial markets has been muted, but remains largely untested. In the aftermath of the 2008 
crisis, banks decreased considerably their dependence on short-term wholesale funding in global 
markets. However, they are still exposed to the potential for some funding pressures if global 
financial risks increase sharply, for example via a re-intensification of stress in the euro area, where 
most foreign funding originates. Moreover, so far Korea has been largely unaffected by the capital 
outflows related to a potential UMP exit, but its status of safe haven is still untested. A disorderly 
UMP exit, and a sudden reversal of capital flows could impair the already weak business sentiment 
and investment. Finally, tighter financial conditions could put a brunt on domestic growth as 
funding costs of banks and corporates rise.   
11.      Banks’ profitability has been subject to downward pressures. Since the onset of the 
crisis, the profitability has been impacted negatively by the low interest rate environment 
(compressing the net interest margins), increased credit risk due to deteriorating macroeconomic 
conditions, and conservative regulatory provisioning standards (up to about 150 percent of 
expected losses).3 The return on assets (ROA) of the commercial banks in 2012, at about 0.5 percent, 
is low relative to other countries (Appendix Figure 1). Importantly, the share of non-interest income 
has remained low (Appendix Figure 1). 
12.      Vulnerabilities in the nonfinancial corporate sector have picked up over the past two 
years. Korean firms entered the 2008 crisis with relatively solid balance sheets, following a decade-
long corporate restructuring. Despite the sizeable decline of output during the crisis, the corporate 
sector remained profitable, and its aggregate balance sheet strengthened. However, corporate 
financial conditions deteriorated in 2011 due to the global slowdown, and have remained weak due 
to lower profitability (Appendix Figure 2). The t aggregate debt-at-risk ratio is at a level comparable 
to that prevailing in the midst of the 2008 crisis. Corporate leverage has continued to decline after 
2008, but Korean firms remain more leveraged than OECD peers, and their profitability tends to lag 
behind peers in major advanced and emerging economies. The team’s analysis suggests that a 
shock comparable to that faced by an average firm during the 2008 crisis would induce aggregate 
expected losses comparable to late 2008 levels. 
13.      Vulnerabilities are more acute in sectors most affected by the post 2008 crisis 
economic slowdown, as well as across SMEs. Balance sheet pressures and weak earnings are 
concentrated in sectors facing structural challenges (construction and real estate development) or 
those exposed to the global downturn (shipbuilding and transportation). Overall, SMEs are more 
leveraged and less profitable compared to large corporations. At 2 percent, SMEs’ return on assets 
                                                   
3 The credit quality has remained stable due to the sales and write-offs of NPLs. 
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in 2011 was about 0.5 percentage points below that of large corporations. SMEs’ leverage ratio at 
end-2011 was also 35 percentage points higher than the 145 percent for large corporations. To 
some extent, the issue may be structural as extensive government support is likely provides a lifeline 
to a potentially unproductive and financially weak SMEs. 
14.      Korean financial institutions are highly exposed to the household sector, but in the 
absence of macroeconomic shocks near-term risks should be manageable (Box 2).4 Household 
leverage is high by international standards, with household debt accounting for 136 percent of 
disposable income at end-2012, and has been rising, albeit at a slower pace. In the near term, the 
banking sector vulnerabilities related to household lending are relatively limited due to conservative 
macroprudential limits (see below), a robust process for collateral collection, and high household net 
wealth. However, the macroprudential requirements on bank household exposures appear to have 
increased credit risk at some NBFIs. In recent years, lower-income and lower-rated households have 
been increasingly securing credit via NBDIs, and the share of delinquent loans at some NBDIs is now 
relatively high.5 The rising importance of NBDIs calls for a better alignment of the regulatory and 
supervisory rules applied to NBDIs with those applied to banks.6  
15.      Further deterioration in the housing market could lead to an upsurge in household 
credit risks. Sensitivity analysis (Figure 1)7 suggests that household debt-related vulnerabilities are 
tightly linked to housing prices, given the high share of real estate in households’ wealth. Under the 
baseline scenario, the aggregate level of debt at risk not covered by all assets stands at only 0.7 
percent against 21.9 percent if the absorptive capacity of financial assets only is taken into account, 
suggesting that housing debt soundness is sensitive to a decline in housing-related wealth.  
  
                                                   
4 The share of household debt owed by borrowers with high DSR (>40 percent) and high LTI (>400 percent) was 
35 percent in July 2010, up from 30 percent in July 2009. At end-2012, the share of debt owed by borrowers with 
high DSR (>40 percent) alone is estimated to be 33 percent. 
5 Related vulnerabilities are difficult to quantify given the lack of detailed data on NBDIs’ household lending patterns. 
6 NDFIs accounted for 20 percent of household credit at end-2012, while all NBFIs accounted for 45 percent. 
7 Sensitivity analysis carried out by the Korean Institute of Finance (KIF) was based on a framework provided by the 
FSAP team and jointly agreed parameters. The magnitude of the shocks is comparable to those in banking sector 
stress tests. However, only shocks with direct impact on household debt service were considered, with no feedback 
effects on house price, for example, given lack of adequate historical data on household debt distributions. 
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Box 2. Household Debt-Related Risks 
In the past decade, Korean households have become highly leveraged as the growth of household credit has 
outstripped income growth. Household debt, as a share of disposable income has increased by more than 
40 percentage points, from 116 percent in 2004 to 156 percent at end-2011.* In absolute terms, household 
leverage is also high by OECD standards. The median household debt to disposable income across OECD 
countries in 2011 was 128 percent. 
The ability of households to meet the high debt burden 
is partly supported by high level of wealth concentrated 
in real estate. Household wealth in Korea is high by 
international standards and, in the aggregate, exceeds by a 
large margin the level of outstanding debt. At end-2012, 
households’ net assets accounted for 115 percent of 
household debt. Most of these assets were relatively liquid, 
including a large share of currency and deposits, which 
accounted for more than 45 percent of financial assets (far 
above levels in the U.S. and Germany). However, the 
preponderance of household assets takes the form of real estate (75 percent of total assets) subject to potentially 
adverse housing price movements. Other mitigating factors include low loan-to-value (LTV) values, currently at around 
50 percent. In addition, banks’ collateral collection is robust with recovery of up to 120 percent of loan values. 
Despite the relatively benign aggregate picture, there are pockets of vulnerabilities due to various factors: 
 The structure of household debt. A substantial share of household loans are structured as bullet loans, exposing 
households to refinancing risks since principals need to be refinanced periodically. The share of such loans has 
declined from 41.3 percent at end-2010 to 33.6 percent in March 2013, but remains high. Moreover, household debt is 
dominated by variable rate loans, exposing households to a sharp rise of financing costs in case of a rise in interest 
rates. The share of fixed rate loans has increased from 5.1 percent at end-2010 to 39.5 percent in May 2013. 
The uneven distribution of debt and assets across households. Recently household debt has increased more at 
lower ends of the income distribution. A shock to these households’ repayment capacity (i.e., due to a further decline 
in their disposable incomes) could lead to financial sector losses and should, thus, be monitored carefully. 
The sizable increase in lending by NBFIs. While the pace of household loan growth by banks has decelerated, 
lending by nonbanks has risen sharply. As of end-2012, NBFIs accounted for 45 percent of household lending. The 
financial stability challenges of nonbank lending are related to the less regulated nature of these institutions, and their 
tendency to tap less creditworthy borrowers unable to access bank funding due to banks’ tighter lending standards. 
The increase in the debt of multiple loan borrowers. The debt of borrowers taking out multiple loans rose 
considerably from KRW 262 trillion in June 2010 to KRW 306 trillion at end-2012, as did the number of multiple loan 
borrowers. There are some indications that the quality of these loans may be worsening, as the delinquencies of 
multiple loan borrowers are higher than for others and are rising. 
* The OECD-wide data used here covers both households and non-profit institutions serving households, a broader 
definition of households than the one used in the rest of the report. 
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Figure 1. Household Sector Debt at Risk not Covered by Assets 
(In percent of total debt in a specific group; before and after shock) 
Source: KIF based on data from the Household Survey of the Korea National Statistical Office, and a framework 
provided by the IMF FSAP team. 
Note: Debt at risk refers to the share of debt owed by borrowers with debt service ratio (DSR) over 40 percent. 
 
16.      The authorities need to support continual gradual household deleveraging to ensure 
adequate growth momentum without fueling financial stability concerns. Apart from strong 
macroeconomic policies and structural policies to bolster the real economy and household 
disposable incomes, this process should include: (i) tighter regulation of NBFIs to curb further credit 
expansion via regulatory arbitrage; (ii) further transformation of the structure of household debt 
towards fixed rate amortizing loans, while ensuring that such loans are priced to fully reflect risks; 
and (iii) expanded availability of debt counseling services, providing budget and legal advice to 
households.  
17.      Overall, banks’ NPL levels are low, reflecting a practice of active disposal of bad assets, 
mostly via market mechanisms. The NPLs of commercial banks accounted for 1.2 percent of total 
loans at end-2012, with an average of about 1 percent per year written off or sold to Asset 
Management Companies (AMCs). Most distressed assets are purchased by private entities, which 
fund purchases via the issuance of corporate bonds. The effectiveness of this process is supported 
by a robust collateral recovery process. Recovery rates are reportedly high, with lenders legally 
having senior claims on up to 120 percent of the value of a loan. The robustness of these 
mechanisms in a context of a sharp decline in housing prices has not been tested. 
18.      However, the financial sector is subject to distortions that need to be addressed. It is 
important to ensure that banks have full operational autonomy to undertake risk-based allocation of 
credit, including developing risk pricing skills to provide non-guaranteed funding to a broader range 
of viable SMEs, supported by enhanced risk management. Curbing pressures on banks to cut 
interest rates and fees would be beneficial to avoid depressing bank profits and limit the availability 
of credit for higher risk borrowers. 
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C.   Stress Tests of Banks and Nonbank Depository Institutions 
Banking sector 
19.      The team’s analysis suggests that the commercial banking system would remain sound 
even under extreme shocks to macroeconomic growth or protracted sluggish movement of 
the economy (Box 3). This reflects high initial capital buffers and conservative capital management. 
The system-wide capital ratios remain considerably above the Basel III requirement even under a 
very adverse macro scenario (Appendix Figures 4 and 5) and all banks meet the Basel III capital 
requirements, with CARs remaining at about or above 10 percent.  
20.      The impact of higher interest rates due to a potential disorderly exit from 
unconventional monetary policies (UMP) in the U.S. would also be limited. However, this 
should not lead to complacency given that the robustness of the results is subject to model 
limitations.8 
21.      Banks also remain solvent if potential second-round spillover effects are taken into 
consideration.9 The stress tests evaluated the potential amplification of the effect of 
macroeconomic shocks due to the propagation through interbank and macro-financial linkages. 
While the level of bank capital deteriorates further, as expected, the effects tend to be limited, and 
the aggregate CAR of the sector declines only marginally. By end-2017, when the accumulated 
effect is the largest, the aggregate CAR under the severe scenario would decline to 12 percent 
taking into account contagion effects, against 13.6 percent without such effects (Appendix Figure 4). 
The macro model used does not explicitly capture some of the linkages, particularly the link 
between higher interest rates and the DSR. To correct for this, an exogenous consumption shock 
was applied based on a model linking consumption to DSR. Here also, model limitations may have 
underestimated the potential impact (see footnote 8). 
22.      Banks’ market risks are muted, in part due to limited securities’ holdings. Banks’ market 
risk exposures at end-2012 were about eight times smaller than credit risk exposures, and were 
mostly in the form of debt securities holdings. Even under the most adverse scenario of a sharp 
economic downturn, market risks would account for only up to 0.3 percent of risk-weighted assets 
in 2014 under the BU exercise, and 0.8 percent in 2013 under the TD exercise (Appendix Figure 6). 
Overall, TD estimates suggest that a market shock would reduce the capital adequacy ratio of the 
top seven banks by only about 1.3 percent.   
                                                   
8 The macro model used does not explicitly capture some of the linkages, particularly, the link between higher 
interest rates and the DSRs. To correct for this, an exogenous consumption shock was applied based on a model 
linking consumption to DSR. Such an approach (the only feasible alternative, given modeling constraints) may have 
underestimated the potential impact. 
9 This builds upon the results of the previously discussed stress tests. 
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Box 3. Banking Sector: Stress Test Scenarios and Shocks 
The FSAP conducted comprehensive solvency and liquidity stress tests of the banking system, as well as analysis of 
contagion effects across banks, and simple stress tests of nonbank depository institutions. Sensitivity tests on the 
exposure of the banking sector to movements in interest rates and housing prices were also carried out. Given the lack of 
sufficient public data, the assessments were performed by the authorities based on a stress testing framework agreed with 
the FSAP team, and validation of models and results by the FSAP team. The validation included extensive discussions with 
the BOK and the FSS and detailed reviews of the methodologies, computations, and results of the stress tests. The TD tests 
made use of the BOK’s Systemic Risk Assessment Model for Macroprudential Policy (SAMP). Bottom-up (BU) tests by the top 
seven domestic banks were also carried out. The key macro and financial variables for TD and BU tests were projected using 
BOK’s macro models. All TD estimations were completed by the BOK and all BU estimations by the participating banks in 
coordination with the FSS. Liquidity tests were carried out at both the TD level by the FSS, and at the BU level by individual 
banks. The FSAP team did not carry out independent stress tests due to the lack of sufficient publicly available data.  
Solvency tests assumed a five-year horizon and evaluated the impact of extreme macroeconomic shocks via four 
scenarios: (i) a mild and a severe global double-dips, with the latter potentially resulting in a slump of real GDP growth to  
-3.8 percent in 2013 and to -2.7 percent in 2014, and gradual recovery to its projected path by the 2017 (the last year of the 
stress testing horizon); (ii) a prolonged period of low economic growth, with real GDP growth 2.5 percentage points below 
projected baseline over the entire 5-year horizon; and (iii) a spike in interest rates from a potential disorderly exit from 
unconventional monetary policy in the U.S., with interest rates increasing by 250 basis points (mid-range of the shocks used 
in the sensitivity analysis below) over 2½ years, starting in the second half of 2014. The resilience of the banking system was 
evaluated via the expected impact of such deterioration in macroeconomic conditions on banks’ credit and market risks, and 
consequently on banks’ capital bases. The solvency tests were carried out both by the authorities and by the banks. 
TD solvency tests also evaluated the additional impact of inter-bank spillovers. Contagion-related losses were 
estimated as second-round losses due to liquidity contagion, using the BOK SAMP model. The FSAP team could not 
estimate its own network model, given that the authorities were unable to share the necessary data. In principle, separate 
modeling frameworks with the BOK SAMP permit an evaluation of second-round effects due to both default and liquidity 
contagion. However, the high capitalization buffers of Korean banks and the lack of bank defaults after the first-round 
solvency shocks made the use of the default contagion model unfeasible. The assessment of liquidity contagion assumed 
that default contagion precedes liquidity contagion. Drops in banks’ capital positions—but not necessarily outright 
defaults—were modeled to lead to higher funding costs, mark-to-market (MTM) losses due to fire sales, and credit crunch 
losses.  
Liquidity tests evaluated the ability of banks to withstand unprecedented shocks to both their FX and local currency 
liquidity conditions. The TD and BU tests were designed as alternative liquidity measures, meant to capture aggregate and 
roll-over liquidity risks respectively, and were evaluated over a 30-day horizon. The shock magnitudes under both scenarios 
were extreme. Under the TD scenarios, banks were assumed to completely lose access to secured wholesale funding, and 
face higher deposit outflows than previously observed in Korea. The assumptions in the BU scenarios were identical, but 
were applied to banks’ rollover rates, rather than to the entire funding base. 
The exposure of banks to potential interest rate and housing price risks was also evaluated via sensitivity analyses. 
These evaluated the impact on the aggregate credit and/or market risks of an increase in interest rates, given the high share 
of variable rate loans (an extreme shock of 300 basis points and a moderate shock of 200 basis points); an exchange rate 
depreciation (an extreme shock of 50 percent, and a moderate shock of 30 percent); and a fall in real house prices (an 
extreme shock of 20 percent and a moderate shock of 15 percent). 
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23.      FX liquidity stress tests suggest that even in the event of unprecedented liquidity 
outflows the system-wide liquidity position would remain manageable. Under a scenario 
involving a shutdown of global wholesale funding, the aggregate gap for all commercial banks 
amounts to around US$3.8 billion without taking into account the committed credit lines from 
international banks (about 1.2 percent of Korea’s international reserves); it would turn into a small 
surplus of around US$155 million after taking these credit lines into account. Similarly, Korean won 
liquidity stress tests suggest that individual banks have sufficient liquid assets to handle potential 
outflows under extreme shocks.10  
24.      The authorities carry out stress tests, but the process needs to be enhanced. The FSS 
requires banks to carry out stress tests twice a year for solvency and monthly for liquidity. The BOK 
conducts TD stress tests of the banking sector using supervisory information. However, there are 
issues related to the lack of cross-agency coordination to discuss relevant risk factors and reconcile 
the results. The FSS and the BOK do not share results with each other, and hence do not have a 
channel to validate their respective results. For example, the TD exercise (conducted by the BOK) 
and the BU exercise (conducted by banks and validated by the FSS) produce divergent results on 
market risks (Appendix Figure 6). Differences in the results can account for divergence of views on 
the nature and level of needed policy actions. Making public the stress tests conducted by different 
agencies would also encourage the authorities to coordinate more closely. Furthermore, there is a 
need for to the FSS to maintain close interaction with banks to validate banks’ stress testing results. 
The FSS does not appear to validate fully the BU results received from banks, for example the ways 
in which banks estimate losses. In addition, while banks comply with regulatory requirements, they 
do not appear to run event-specific tests in line with their internal operational needs. Banks tend to 
follow scenarios provided by the FSS that mimic deterioration in macroeconomic and liquidity 
conditions in line with shocks experienced during previous crises. 
Nonbank depository institutions 
25.      The soundness of NBDIs was assessed based on a reverse stress test (Table 4), which 
show that some NBDIs have thin buffers against potential credit risk.11 The reverse stress test 
determined the size of NPL shocks that would account for a drop of capital adequacy below the 
minimum required levels. The lack of data (except for MSBs) justified using a simple balance sheet 
framework. The stress tests assumed: pre-loss profitability at lowest levels historically, and more 
conservative provisioning than rules enforced by Korean supervisors. The results indicate that some 
NBDIs—including mutual savings banks and credit unions—could only handle up to a 6–8 
percentage point increase in nonperforming loans before their capital drops below the minimum 
                                                   
10 An estimate of the stress test by the authorities with data as of end-September 2013, using assumptions identical 
to those used by the FSAP team, shows a decline in the FX liquidity gap to US$1.5 billion before accounting for credit 
lines from international banks, and a surplus of US$3.1 billion after accounting for such credit lines. 
11 Carrying out stress tests for NDFIs was deemed essential, given the collective importance of these institutions for 
the domestic financial stability (they account for 20 percent of domestic household credit). 
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required threshold. However, even in the event of potential NBDIs difficulties, spillovers to other 
parts of the financial sector are likely to be minimal, given that their funding is mostly in deposits. 
Table 2. Korea: Stress Tests of Nonbank Depository Institutions 
(In percent) 
 
MACROPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK 
A.   Macroprudential Measures and their Effectiveness 
26.      The Korean authorities have been actively using macroprudential policy tools with a 
view to contain the build-up of systemic vulnerabilities. LTV ratios were introduced in 2002, in 
response to sharp increases in house-price growth, and complemented by limits on debt-to-income 
(DTI) ratios in 2005. When the Lehman collapse exposed the volatile funding structure of the Korean 
banking system, the authorities introduced a range of measures in order to contain liquidity and FX 
vulnerabilities, including a ceiling on the loan-to-deposit ratio (2009), a regulation on the ratio of FX 
derivatives positions (2010) and a levy on short-term FX funding (2011). Macroprudential policies in 
Korea are at the discretion of the relevant agencies, but subject to informal interagency 
coordination, in particular the recently established MEFM.  
27.      The LTV and DTI policies have been adjusted actively to changing conditions and 
seems to have contributed to the resilience of the Korean financial system. The limits on LTV 
ratios apply nationwide, but are tighter in designated speculative zones, while the limits on DTI 
ratios apply only within the metropolitan area. Since their launch, both ratios were tightened and 
Reverse Stress Test: 
Size of NPL increase that brings NBDIs to minimum capital requirement
Current 
Level
Maximum 
Level 2/
Buffer
Mutual savings banks 6.0 20.0 28.0 8.0
Credit unions 2.0 4.2 9.8 5.6
Agricultural cooperatives 5.0 2.1 14.7 12.6
Fishery cooperatives 0.0 2.7 12.1 9.4
Forestry cooperatives 2.0 2.8 45.3 42.5
Key Assumptions:
1. Pre-loss net income (relative to total assets) is at the lowest level since 2007.j p , y p
recognizable for the provisioning purpose.
3. Required provisioning is 20 percent for secured loans and 100 percent for unsecured loans.
Minimum Capital 
Requirement 1/
NPL ratio
1/ Based on regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets for mutual savings banks (MSBs), and net 
capital to adjusted total assets for credit unions and cooperatives. For MSBs, the current minimum 
capital requirement is 6 percent for entities with total assets of greater than KRW 2 trillion and 5 
percent for others entities.
2/ The maximum level of nonperforming loans that would bring capital to the minimum 
requirement level.
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loosened several times, with the cumulative effect amounting to a considerable tightening relative 
to the levels at which the measures were introduced. The limits were also extended to nonbank 
providers of mortgage credit, even if with some delay.12 The average actual LTV ratio in Korea is 
around 50 percent, which is low when compared to that in other countries (e.g., 74 percent in 
Germany, 75 percent in the U.S. and 80 percent in the United Kingdom), which may have had a 
dampening effect on house price growth and household credit growth over the past decade  
(Kim, 2013), and helped keep mortgage default rates below 1 percent into 2012 despite softening 
housing prices since 2008.13 
28.      Introduction of a ceiling on the ratio of loans to deposits has led to greater resilience 
to liquidity shocks. The ratio of loans to won deposits stood at around 120 percent for domestic 
banks when the authorities announced a ceiling on this ratio of 100 percent. Banks responded by 
reducing their reliance on funding through bonds, short term certificates of deposits and interbank 
loans, and increased funding through core deposits. As a result of the measure, which was first 
enforced in June 2012, the loan-to-deposit ratio has come down substantially, to around 95 percent 
(as of April 2013) on average for commercial banks.14 
29.      The FX-related measures were designed to contain systemic risk from short-term FX 
borrowing by foreign branches and domestic banks. The regulation on the ratio of FX derivatives 
positions was first introduced in October 2010 at 250 percent for foreign branches and 50 percent 
for domestic banks and was since tightened twice, in July 2011 and January 2013, to present levels 
of 150 percent and 30 percent for foreign branches and domestic banks, respectively. This measure 
was designed to curb banks’ building up of excessive FX derivatives positions which tended to be 
financed by short-term borrowing, and as a result, tended to increase maturity mismatches and 
financial vulnerability in the banking system. 
30.      A Macroprudential Stability Levy has complemented the regulation on the ratio of FX 
derivatives position since August 2011. The levy is 20 basis points of the dollar amount of short-
term FX funding with a maturity of less than one year, with lower rates applying to longer maturities 
in a graduated manner, and applies uniformly to both foreign bank branches and domestic banks. 
The levy penalizes carry trades where banks borrow short term in FX, to swap this funding into 
Korean won and invest in local assets. 
31.      The FX-related measures appear to have had the desired effects. The average FX 
leverage ratio of foreign branches has fallen from over 260 percent at the time the ratio of FX 
derivatives position was first announced to around 90 percent on average in late 2013, although this 
                                                   
12 At present, limits on the LTV ratio range between 50 and 60 percent for banks and between 60 and 70 percent for 
nonbanks, while the DTI ratio limit is between 50 percent and 65 percent. 
13 See Kim Choongsoo, Governor of Bank of Korea, “Macroprudential Policies: Korea’s Experiences,” 2013. Since 2008, 
house prices have been falling in Seoul, but have continued to grow in other regions. 
14 The loan-to-deposit ratio used here is based on a definition followed by the FSS and differs from that used in the 
Appendix Table 3. 
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may have been in part due to reduced demand from exporters for forward contracts. The measures 
appear to have contributed to a shift away from short-term FX funding, with its share in all FX 
funding falling from around 50 percent in 2008 to less than 20 percent in April 2013, mostly driven 
by shifts in the maturity structure of the external funding of foreign branches towards longer term 
funding. This shift may have caused interbank capital flows into Korea to become less sensitive to 
global financial conditions since June 2010, compared to other Asian countries (Bruno and Shin 
2013). 
B.   Institutional Arrangement and Recommendations 
32.      Macroprudential policy in Korea has long been coordinated at various levels and 
through a range of interagency meetings. Systemic risk assessments and policy measures were 
discussed in meetings of the informal “FX Market Stabilization Meeting” and the “Economic and 
Financial Market Monitoring Meeting,” and joint press conferences and press releases used to 
announce macroprudential measures. These arrangements were replaced on July 20, 2012 by MEFM 
which is convened at least quarterly at the deputy level and comprises the BOK, the FSC, the FSS, 
and the MOSF, which chairs and prepares the agenda. The scope of the meeting is broad and in 
principle covers all aspects of macroeconomic and financial policy. The authorities strive for 
consensus but the decisions taken at the meeting are not binding, and each agency remains 
ultimately responsible for policy decisions in its domain. Interagency coordination is not confined to 
the MEFM and is strong at working level especially between the MOSF, the FSC, and the FSS. To 
improve information exchange between the agencies, a revised Memorandum of Understanding was 
signed in 2009 and has led to improvements, especially in the sharing especially of supervisory data. 
33.      Korea has done well in applying macroprudential tools and should consider a further 
strengthening of the institutional framework for macroprudential policy. In particular, 
arrangements should be based on a formal and well-focused institutional framework for 
macroprudential policy. They would benefit from enhanced transparency and accountability, a 
greater degree of independence from the political process, and a clarification and strengthening of 
the role of the BOK in financial stability.  
34.      The arrangements for macroprudential policy should be separated from those for 
crisis management and preparedness. Macroprudential policy and crisis management are 
separate policy functions that can benefit from separate institutional frameworks, including from 
greater transparency as well as greater political independence. Separation would also facilitate the 
establishment of a stronger role for the BOK in macroprudential policy.  
35.      The objectives, functions, and powers of a dedicated macroprudential policy council 
should be articulated in primary legislation. The council should have broad power to make 
recommendations to the regulatory agencies, coupled with a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism, as is 
increasingly standard practice. The law should require the BOK to provide regular assessments of 
systemic risk to the council and to formulate draft policy responses for consideration by the council. 
A record of the council’s deliberations should be made public and further accountability to 
parliament and the public be ensured through periodic reports. The council could be chaired by the 
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BOK or the MOSF and should also comprise the financial regulatory and supervisory agencies. The 
council should meet at least quarterly with all participating agencies represented at the top level. 
36.      It will be important that the arrangements for macroprudential policy do not impinge 
on the continued independence of the BOK in conducting monetary policy. Monetary policy 
should therefore be explicitly excluded from the scope of discussion of the council. Alternatively, the 
arrangements could assign the BOK a veto power over policy decisions by the council. 
FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION: LEGAL UNDER-
PINNING AND STRUCTURE 
37.      The legal framework for the financial sector has undergone improvement since the 
2003 FSAP, but there are gaps. Financial sector related laws and subsidiary legislation have been 
continuously updated, and efforts made by the authorities to benchmark against international 
standards and to draw from legal traditions in multiple jurisdictions. Gaps in the legal framework 
relate in particular to the fact that the enforcement approach is predominantly prosecution-centric, 
and the range and level of administrative pecuniary sanctions are relatively small compared with 
other jurisdictions. The introduction of a regime for imposition of administrative penalties in Korea 
in respect to a broader range of offences would enable the financial regulators to implement a more 
effective enforcement system.  
38.      The institutional arrangements for financial sector supervision involve multiple 
agencies. These agencies include: (i) the MOSF: responsible for FX policies and financial and 
economic coordination; (ii) the FSC: responsible for financial sector policy, prudential policy, 
supervision, enforcement, sanctions, and financial institution resolution; (iii) the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC), established within the FSC: responsible for monitoring, supervising and 
investigating capital market activities; (iv) the FSS: responsible for conducting the inspection and 
supervision of financial institutions under the guidance and oversight of the FSC and SFC; (v) the 
KDIC: operating the deposit insurance function and performing the resolution functions under the 
guidance and oversight of the FSC; and (vi) the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (KOFIU): established 
under the oversight of the FSC, performing the financial intelligence function. 15  
39.      Inter-agency mechanisms have been established to facilitate policy coordination and 
conflict resolution, and cross representation at key decision-making levels and multiple 
interlocking government arrangements (Table 3). The inter-agency mechanisms are: (i) the FSC, 
FSS, BOK, MOSF, and KDIC have signed a joint MOU that provides for sharing periodic and non-
scheduled financial information submitted by financial institutions to the BOK, FSS, and KDIC; and 
(ii) the BOK and KDIC can request the FSS to undertake joint examinations of regulated entities and 
share examination reports. Following joint BOK/FSS examinations, the BOK may request the FSS to 
take any necessary corrective measures in areas under its mandate. The BOK’s Monetary Policy 
                                                   
15 Joint examinations between the BOK and FSS are also possible.  
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Committee (MPC) may also request that the FSC reconsider a decision it has taken if it has a direct 
bearing on monetary and credit policies.16 
Table 3. Korea: Interconnectedness of Financial Sector Oversight Decision-making Bodies 
 
Name  MOSF BOK FSC FSS FSC-SFC KDIC OTHERS 
Macroeconomic 
Financial 
Meeting 
CHAIR: 
Vice 
Minister  
Senior Deputy 
Governor 
Vice Chair Senior 
Deputy 
Governor
- Vice President - 
Bank of Korea 
(Monetary 
Policy 
Committee) 
Vice 
Minister 
(non-
voting 
member) 
CHAIR: 
Governor; and 
Sr. Deputy 
Governor 
Vice Chair 
(non-
voting 
member) 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Five other members (one 
member each 
recommended by BOK, 
MOSF, FSC, Korea 
Chamber of Commerce 
& Industry, and Korea 
Federation of Banks) 
Financial 
Services 
Commission 
Vice 
Minister 
Senior Deputy 
Governor 
CHAIR: FSC 
Chairman; 
and FSC 
Vice Chair 
Governor  
 
- 
President Three external members 
including one member 
recommended by 
Chamber of Commerce 
FSC-SFC  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Chair: FSC 
Vice 
Chairman 
 
- 
One Standing 
commissioner and three 
non standing 
commissioners 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Committee 
Vice 
Minister 
Senior Deputy 
Governor 
Vice Chair 
 
 
      - 
 
- 
CHAIR: 
President 
Three external members 
Financial 
Supervisory 
Services 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
CHAIR: 
Gov., Sr. 
Dep. 
Gov. 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
SECTORAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
40.      Detailed assessments of observance of the most relevant financial sector standards 
and codes were undertaken. 17 Information was also obtained to update the November 2008 
assessment of compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40+9 Recommendations on 
the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). 
  
                                                   
16 Article 89(2) of the BOK Act notes that the FSC, if requested by the BOK to review a decision, needs a two thirds 
majority to retain its original decision. 
17 See the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes for summary assessments of Korea’s observance of 
financial standards and codes. 
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A.   Banking 
41.      The FSC and FSS have made considerable progress in addressing issues raised during 
the 2003 FSAP and has achieved moderate compliance with the BCPs as revised in 2012. 
Numerous structural changes and regulatory reforms have been implemented aimed at 
strengthening the supervisory framework. This effort, along with a coordinated response by the 
public sector, has gone a long way in helping to improve the robustness of the banking sector which 
performed well during the 2008 crisis. Conservative requirements in respect of capital, liquidity and 
loan loss provisioning have also been important in this regard.  
42.      Although banking supervision has been enhanced, further emphasis towards a more 
risk-sensitive approach would be beneficial. The FSC-FSS operates with a detailed off-site 
supervisory process, supported by a broad range of data collected on a periodical basis. The on-site 
examination process would benefit from more flexible and frequent examinations, tailored to ensure 
strong surveillance of the most relevant risks. Enhancements to the judgmental component of the 
assessments and the appointment of a point of contact in charge of all aspects related to a 
particular bank/banking group is key in achieving a comprehensive view of risk. Supervision 
practices could be developed further to be more intrusive in assessing corporate governance 
particularly in assessing the Board’s oversight of risk management (Box 5). 
43.      The Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) will be an important 
stepping stone in achieving an integrated approach to capital planning and higher standards 
of risk management. When fully implemented it will provide a framework for a comprehensive 
assessment of risk and capital and will help in assigning individual bank capital ratios. The average 
CAR for the banking sector, at about 13.8 percent, provides a healthy buffer over prudential 
minimums. Basel II applies to the commercial banks. FHCs are subject to Basel I; current plans to 
apply Basel II to FHCs by December 2013 will improve the consistency and comparability of the 
capital base for Korean banks. The FSS plans to implement Basel III in December 2013. 
44.      The FSC and FSS have taken the first step in developing a framework for group 
supervision of the large complex financial institutions by enacting the FHC Act. Nonetheless, 
further effort is needed to achieve an effective approach to group supervision. The FSS-FSC is yet to 
consistently apply minimum requirements for capital, liquidity and risk management on a group-
wide basis. Effective supervision of group structures should be seen as a priority to achieve a 
consolidated view of risk that takes into account linkages in organizational structure and inter-group 
transactions.  
45.      Prudential regulations covering loan loss provisioning have been strengthened. In 
transitioning to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a reserve for Credit Loss was 
introduced to prevent a decrease of banks’ capacity to absorb losses. The non-performing loan 
ratios for the domestic banks remain low by international standards. However there are areas to 
improve provisioning practices, especially where loans return from default to performing status, 
which should be tightly controlled. Since the 2008 crisis, government-sponsored AMCs have been 
introduced to acquire NPLs in several sectors of the economy (see above).
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Box 5. Korea: Supervisory Intensity 
To be effective, supervision must be intrusive, adaptive, proactive, comprehensive, and conclusive. 
Supervision intensity is characteristic of these key elements; it represents the ability to act, as well as the 
demonstrated willingness of the supervisor to follow up if issues are identified. Against this background, 
the main features of supervisory intensity in Korea are as follows (see also Appendix II):  
 Onsite examination by the FSS is an intensive process, which compares well with best practice in 
terms of its comprehensiveness. For the larger, more complex, and systemically important banks, 
greater frequency of onsite examinations would enable supervisors to act more proactively in 
detecting emerging risks and adapting the supervisory stance accordingly. Fully leveraging the use 
of supervisory tools to differentiate banks’ risk profile will help allocate scarce supervisory 
resources toward the riskiest banks. 
 Regarding corporate governance, systematic meetings with the full banks’ board in the context of 
onsite examination would allow the FSS to more accurately assess the Board’s understanding of 
the banking group’s operational structure and risks.  
 The FSS increased the frequency of its onsite supervision of MSBs, enhanced corporate 
governance requirements, and strengthened offsite surveillance. More frequent and intrusive 
approach to assessing the effectiveness of the MSB’s Board of directors should be implemented.  
 FSS relies on highly skilled and commitment of staff, supported by a detailed off-site supervisory 
process and tools. More frequent assessments of risk management information would help 
produce a comprehensive view of risk. By applying an intrusive approach to the assessment of the 
Board, and challenging it’s oversight of risk management, the FSC-FSS will be able to encourage 
higher standards of corporate governance. 
 
46.      Banks operate with strong liquidity ratios, especially foreign currency liquidity 
requirements, which are more conservative in their calibration than domestic liquidity. Banks 
need to comply with a one-to-one loan-to-deposit ratio restricting leverage and while foreign 
currency denominated asset-liability regulatory requirements are tightly managed, there is scope to 
enhance liquidity risk management of won-denominated asset-liability. Transition to the Basel III 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) framework will provide a useful step in this regard and banks are 
currently required to report LCR ratios on a quarterly basis. 
47.      Authorization processes are generally thorough but there is room to require formal 
approval for certain activities. Major acquisitions and transfer of ownership rely on a process of 
notification as opposed to an explicit approval by the supervisor. The requirement to obtain an 
approval involves a higher standard of due diligence and enables the supervisory authorities to take 
action early in the process if deemed necessary.  
48.      A regulatory and supervisory framework consistent with banks should be applied to 
the larger non-bank deposit taking institutions (i.e., mutual savings banks) strengthen their 
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resilience to shocks. The capital framework for non-bank deposit taking institutions is a net capital 
ratio of equity over the sum of total assets and loan loss provisions. For those non-bank deposit 
taking institutions that are of an equivalent size to banks, the capital framework should be 
strengthened and calculated using the Basel computations and definitions. 
B.   Insurance 
49.      The insurance supervisory system in Korea shows a high level of observance of the 
Insurance Core Principles (ICPs), and the supervisory and regulatory structure. Compared to 
the previous FSAP, reforms have been made that are now proactive to achieve best practices rather 
than remedial in response to the financial crisis of the late 1990s. The authorities have implemented 
IFRS accounting standards, updated the capital regime, and many other regulatory requirements in 
a proactive and timely manner. Limited weaknesses in the regulatory structure are well understood 
by the authorities and proposals for reform have been developed. The authorities have developed a 
sound Risk Assessment Application System (RAAS), and their attention to insurance fraud is 
impressive.  
50.      The insurance sector in Korea has long been one of the most significant in the world in 
terms of penetration. Total premium stood at KRW 149.9 trillion (USD 134 billion) in 2011 ranking 
it the eighth largest in the world. Insurance penetration stood at 11.6 percent and was ranked 5th in 
the world and insurance density stood at USD 2,660 per person ranked 23rd in the world. Insurance 
market concentration indicates an open and competitive market. All of the large insurers are 
substantially domestic with both assets and premiums attributable to their domestic business well 
above 90 percent. They do not currently meet the expected criteria for either IAIS Global Systemic 
Insurers or ConFrame IAIG supervision. 
51.      Negative interest rate spreads remain an issue but the challenges have been mitigated 
substantially by having recognized the issue well before many other jurisdictions. The late 
1990s financial crisis brought the issue to attention and led to timely corrective actions. An active 
program of stress testing and other methods, along with actions by insurers has greatly reduced 
negative spread risk. However, the risk remains, albeit at reduced levels, and needs to be monitored 
on an ongoing basis. Insurer profitability and capital are sound for both life and non-life insurance. 
52.      Industry capacity for enhanced enterprise risk management will take time to mature. 
Continuing the development of risk management capacity can be supported by current 
initiatives to enhance requirements. Observance will be improved further as ongoing initiatives 
progress. Enhanced risk management, and group supervision will become more important and can 
be enhanced progressively using existing platforms for cooperation. G-SIFI and ComFrame could be 
relevant for Korea at least as a host supervisor in the short term. Becoming a signatory to the IAIS 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) is in progress. 
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C.   Securities 
53.      Significant progress was made since the last FSAP in revising the securities regulatory 
framework, with the current framework achieving good overall compliance with the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles. Importantly, the 
earlier legal impediments to international cooperation and exchange of information have been 
removed. Since 2011, Korea also applies the Korean International Financial Reporting Standards  
(K-IFRS) that follow the IFRS.  
54.      Although the regulators’ responsibilities are defined in legislation, the complexity of 
the structure obscures the transparency of the decision-making processes. The responsibility 
for deciding on a particular supervisory or enforcement action can lie either at the FSC, SFC, or FSS, 
depending on the nature and gravity of action, but it is not always clear which one of them is 
ultimately in charge. The process is further complicated by the use of pre-deliberation committees 
at various levels. Self-regulatory organizations - the KRX, the Korea Financial Investment Association 
(KOFIA) and the Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants (KICPA)—also play a role in the 
regulatory and supervisory processes. Publication of additional information on the decision-making 
structure and processes would be beneficial.  
55.      The authorities have a broad set of powers, most of which are used effectively. The on-
site examination program could be expanded to ensure sufficient coverage of smaller entities, in 
particular asset management companies and auditors. Improved oversight of small auditors is 
important to address challenges in enforcing compliance with the auditor independence and quality 
control requirements. The on-site inspections should also continue to focus on ensuring proper 
handling of customer securities and funds.  
56.      Despite recent improvements announced or taken by the authorities, challenges 
remain in enforcing compliance with the unfair trading/market abuse provisions of the 
Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (FISCMA). This is primarily due to the lack 
of sufficiently dissuasive administrative sanctions and the length and less than optimal outcome of 
the criminal enforcement process. Jointly with the public prosecutor’s office, the authorities should 
continue to seek ways to improve both the administrative and criminal enforcement powers and 
processes. 
57.      Comprehensive disclosure requirements apply to both issuers and collective 
investment schemes (CIS). Applicable rules prescribe the content of primary market, periodic and 
ongoing disclosures. While their prescriptive nature ensures compliance with the IOSCO Principles, 
the authorities are encouraged to monitor whether the current ongoing disclosure requirements for 
issuers continues to best serve the interests of investors and market evolution while maintaining a 
manageable compliance burden. Given the risks arising to investors from any shortcomings in CIS 
custody and valuation, it is important to focus on monitoring compliance and require the use of 
market or fair value for all CIS.
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58.      The current processes to monitor systemic risk do not appear to sufficiently 
acknowledge the potential for systemic risk arising from the securities sector. This combined 
with certain deficiencies in the regulators’ arrangements to manage defaults could negatively impact 
their ability to deal with market disruptions and institutional failures. 
D.   Financial Markets Infrastructures 
59.      Korea has a well-developed payment, clearing, and settlement infrastructure. BOK-
WIRE+ is the real-time interbank gross payment and settlement system, and the backbone of the 
infrastructure where the final payments of various markets are settled.18 The KRX is the main player 
in the securities and derivatives market, operating three exchanges and offering CCP settlement 
services for all securities and derivatives traded on the KRX.19 While the authorities have decided to 
establish a CCP for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives at a future date, discussions are ongoing on 
the desirability of transforming the current trade reporting systems into full-fledged trade 
repositories (TRs). The planned CCP for OTC derivatives should ensure full compliance with the PFMI 
before being launched, taking into account lessons learned from the assessment of the CCP for 
exchange-traded products.  
60.      BOK-Wire+ is largely compliant with the international Principles for Financial Markets 
Infrastructures (PFMI). It is subject to comprehensive and transparent risk management 
frameworks comprising clear policies and guidelines, governance arrangements, and operational 
systems including regularly tested default and business continuity procedures. All transactions once 
settled in BOK-Wire+ are deemed final and irrevocable, as well as bankruptcy remote.  
61.      Improvements are needed in certain areas to enhance the level of compliance with the 
PFMI. It is recommended that the operator of BOK-Wire: (i) improves the collateral risk 
management framework, by adopting regular testing of haircuts, and putting in place an annual 
independent validation of the haircut procedures adopted; (ii) provides more clarity in the 
regulations on settlement finality and queue management, particularly with regard to revocation of 
queued transactions; (iii) fully implements the disclosure framework, including disclosure of relevant 
rules and regulations in English; and (iv) strengthens BOK’s powers of oversight over linked payment 
FMIs and participants, particularly to obtain authentic information and enforce compliance by FMIs 
with its observations and findings.  
                                                   
18 The current BOK-Wire+ system in place since 2009 and has a hybrid settlement function using continuous bilateral 
and multilateral offsetting mechanisms enabling participants to save on intraday liquidity. It is used for settlement of 
all short-term financial transactions, cash leg of DVP securities settlement, KRW leg of FX Contingent Liabilities (CLs), 
and settlement and the net settlement of retail payment systems. BOK-Wire+ is also used for monetary policy 
operations and for the issuance and redemption of government and other public bonds. 
19 The KRX operates three exchanges: the Korea Composite Stock Index (KOSPI), Korean Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ), and derivatives market (DM). It also has a majority stake in the KSD, which is a 
securities settlement system, central securities depository (CSD), and maintains the register for all securities traded 
on the KRX. In 2012, the KRX was the world’s number one in stock index options, with a total volume of 1.6 billion 
traded contracts. It was number 5 measured in value of bond trading and number 8 in value of share trading. At the 
end of 2012, market capitalization reached USD 1,179 billion (mostly on account of domestic companies). 
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62.      The central counterparty (CCP) of Korea Exchange, which broadly complies with the 
PFMIs, contributes to the safety and efficiency of the securities and derivatives market in 
Korea, but also concentrates systemic risk. Important steps to improve its risk management 
systems have been initiated in the recent period such as the introduction of intraday margin calls, 
back testing, and sensitivity analysis, which need to be further developed. The sizes of the joint 
compensation fund and settlement reserves have been increased to strengthen KRX’s financial 
protection against a potential default of its clearing members. The introduction of the operational 
risk management system in January 2013 enables the KRX to manage its companywide risks in a 
consistent and comprehensive manner. 
63.      Additional steps to further compliance of the CCP with the PFMIs related to the 
management of credit risks are warranted. KRX should reform the credit risk management 
framework for the securities market, by collecting risk-based collateral (margin) on a daily basis to 
cover KRX’s exposures towards its clearing members between the transaction and settlement days. 
KRX may also reconsider the current design of its joint compensation funds, in particular by 
removing the fixed size requirement of the fund to better adapt to increased exposures. KRX’s 
criteria for settlement banks and custodians should be increased. Finally, KRX’s risk management 
framework, and in particular its margin model, should be reviewed and validated by an experienced 
and independent entity, such as an academic or a consultant.  
64.      The independence of the KRX risk management committee should be improved and 
the size of staff responsible for the management of credit and liquidity risk should be 
increased. The committee, although independent of the business departments, is chaired by an 
executive director who is also responsible for strategy and planning, and therefore not fully 
independent from business related matters. Staffing levels in the risk management team and the 
clearing and settlement department responsible for risk management is small compared to the 
scope of their responsibilities; it should be increased. More generally, the focus of KRX on the safety 
and efficiency of the CCP could be increased, for example by placing higher priority on the safety 
and efficiency of the CCP and on financial stability in the KRX’s company objectives. 
65.      Regarding the regulation, supervision and oversight of FMIs, the cooperation between 
the BOK and the FSC should be formalized. That would involve: (i) developing an MOU having a 
sound legal basis to ensure effective coordination between the BOK and FSC where their roles as 
regulators overlap. Such a formal arrangement should help enhance cooperation at the appropriate 
technical and management levels and should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
regulation, supervision and oversight, in particular in relation to the KRX-CCP and the KSD; 
(ii) “speaking with one voice,” to avoid any potential inefficiencies in the BOK and FSC 
communication with the KRX and KSD; (iii) agreeing on specific arrangements regarding the 
frequency of exchanges of information, and holding joint meetings with the FSS, KRX and KSD; and 
(iv) developing and testing a crisis management plan to enable timely and effective cooperation in 
times of crisis. 
66.      To further improve the regulatory structure for FMIs the powers of the BOK and the 
resources of the FSC should be increased. Existing legislation should be amended to provide the 
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BOK with enforcement tools to effectively discharge its oversight responsibilities. In addition, an 
increase in human resources at the FSC is warranted to support a proactive policy approach and 
effective guidance by the FSC to the FSS. 
E.   Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism20 
67.      Korea has taken significant steps to enhance its AML/CFT framework. In November 
2008, Korea’s AML/CFT framework was assessed by the FATF, the standard setter of which Korea is a 
member. At the time, Korea’s AML/CFT framework suffered from a number of significant 
deficiencies. Since then, the authorities have made regular and steady progress in addressing the 
main shortcomings identified, notably by amending existing legislation.21 Furthermore, additional 
resources have been allotted to both Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and KoFIU to enhance the 
capacity of AML/CFT supervision and examination, and regular training has been provided to staff of 
law enforcement agencies to improve the effective implementation of sanctions for money 
laundering (ML).  
68.      Additional measures are required to address remaining deficiencies. Some of the main 
concerns relate to: (i) the supervisory sanction regime, whose primary targets are not financial 
institutions, but rather their staff, and which include mostly non-pecuniary sanctions; and (ii) the 
AML/CFT regulation and supervision of the designated nonfinancial businesses and professions 
which currently encompass only casinos. The shortcomings in the terrorist financing offence also 
remain a concern, although a draft bill amending the Prohibition of Financing for Offences of Public 
Intimidation Act is being drafted with a view to expanding the scope of the offence and is expected 
to be submitted to the National Assembly later this year. The FATF has tentatively scheduled Korea 
for an assessment against the revised AML/CFT standard in 2016. 
F.   Conclusions and Recommendations 
69.      The current supervisory structure seems to meet the operating needs but there are a 
number of concerns. In particular, the current governance structures, decision making systems and 
accountability arrangements promote consensus building and provide a practical framework for 
coordination between different agencies, but there are nonetheless concerns that they compromise 
the independence of the supervisors. The presence of industry nominees on the governance 
structures of the supervisory authorities could also give rise to “regulatory capture.” Finally, current 
                                                   
20 This section draws on Korea’s 6th and 7th progress reports to the FATF. 
21 A bill amending the Financial Transaction Reports Act has been submitted to the National Assembly for approval. 
The amendment would abolish the threshold for reporting of suspicious transactions and require banks to ensure 
that full originator information travel with wire transfers. The authorities are also expecting to ratify the Palermo 
Convention by the end of this year after all relevant legislations have been amended to criminalize transnational 
organized crime. 
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responsibilities of the supervisory authorities include financial policies and market development, 
which give room for conflicts of interest and dilution of supervision.22 
70.      Going forward, consideration should be given to streamlining the institutional 
framework for financial sector supervision and further strengthening supervisory 
independence, in the light of the rapid evolution of the financial system in Korea, its expansion in 
the region, and the fast evolving global regulatory and supervisory environment. The reform efforts 
should in particular ensure that the new arrangement: (i) has well identified objectives and 
responsibilities that clearly and transparently define the responsibilities of the various authorities in 
prudential and conduct of business supervision and enforcement; (ii) is free of political influence and 
interference, or the perception of it; (iii) is able to set and enforce a set of prudential requirements at 
system level as well as for individual institutions in accordance with their risk profile and systemic 
importance; (iv) has explicit powers to take timely supervisory response measures, including a range 
of sanctions, enforcement actions, and revocation of license; (v) is familiar with the market and 
market practices, but independent of market influences; and (vi) has efficient internal systems that 
eliminate administrative layers. 
SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY 
71.      In normal times the markets work well underpinned by high domestic currency 
liquidity and a tighter control on FX funding risks. The Korean financial system’s structural 
liquidity overhang of around KRW 230 trillion (about 20 percent of GDP) means that in normal times 
the markets are well supported. Steps to more closely manage the funding risks associated with 
exporters’ and multinationals’ structural needs for medium to long term foreign currency have led to 
declining FX liquidity exposures since the GFC period (Appendix Figure 9). 
72.      The money market has underlying vulnerabilities in stress situations. Much of the 
money market lacks active secondary markets, with the most actively traded being the unsecured 
cash and repo markets of maturities of up to one week. The markets for longer term instruments are 
relatively shallow and dominated by buy and hold investors and there are no market makers. 
73.      The absence of active secondary markets means the BOK plays a prominent role in 
backstopping the markets. While banks maintain liquidity standards in line with current prudential 
requirements, they hold few assets that could be used to raise liquidity from secondary markets in a 
stress situation leaving the BOK a prominent role. The BOK’s significant capacity to respond to 
                                                   
22 The stated objectives of the FSC are as follows: (i) to promote the advancement of the financial industry; (ii) to 
promote the stability of the financial markets; (iii) to establish sound credit activity and fair financial transaction 
practices; and (iv) to protect depositors, investors and other financial consumers.  
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liquidity pressures, including significant foreign reserves and swap lines along with wide ranging ELA 
powers that were broadened after the GFC are mitigating factors.23 
74.      Measures to boost secondary markets will help increase the degree of market self 
reliance; ensuring that ELA procedures are well honed will ensure that quick action is possible. 
Boosting the liquidity of secondary markets would give market participants more self reliance in a 
liquidity stress period reducing the need for reliance on the BOK. The authorities’ plans to 
implement the Basel III LCR will be helpful in this regard, as well as ongoing efforts to improve repo 
markets. The BOK should ensure that their ELA plans are well developed and practiced, as well as 
understood and accepted by key stakeholders so as to smooth decision making in what may be fast 
moving and uncertain conditions, as well as guide expectations and accountability. 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION 
FRAMEWORK 
75.      The financial safety net comprising a deposit insurance scheme and the central bank’ 
ELA are well established, and supported by a well developed framework of financial sector 
supervision. Several well established and efficient options that are available for managing a 
financial crisis include: the ability to influence systemic liquidity in money and securities markets; 
broad deposit insurance and investor protection (including full guarantee); public funds to support 
financial institutions and markets that may be under stress; and mechanisms to intervene and 
resolve troubled financial institutions.  
76.      Improving and formalizing the framework for crisis management would help preserve 
and build upon institutional memory and existing frameworks. The authorities can consider 
formally setting up a dedicated apex forum for leading the inter-agency cooperation and 
coordination work on crisis preparedness and crisis management, distinct from the council proposed 
for macroprudential policies. The authorities can also formally designate crisis management team(s) 
in each supervisory authority; develop a crisis management handbook; establish multi-agency 
institution-specific crisis management groups; and periodically conduct crisis simulation exercises to 
test and enhance contingency plans and crisis management arrangements.  
77.      Recognizing the importance of the role of the KDIC, the authorities can make 
improvements to further promote its ability to intervene effectively during or leading up to a 
                                                   
23 The BOK Act was revised in 2011 with a view to broaden the range of powers and tools to provide liquidity 
assistance to the financial system in stress situations, including through lending or purchasing of securities of 
banking institutions and for-profit entities. Decisions relating to lending operations are taken by the MPC with a 
required attendance of at least 5 members and a simple majority required for normal lending operations and a 
4 person majority decision required for ELA. At end-March 2013, the BOK held US$327.4 billion of reserves  
(28 percent of GDP), and had bilateral swap lines with the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC), the Chang Mai Initiative 
(CMI), and the Bank of Japan (BOJ), as well as a multilateral swap lines via the newly introduced Chang Mai 
Multilateral Initiative. 
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crisis without exposing itself to avoidable losses. These include: (i) replenishing the deposit 
insurance fund which is currently in deficit; (ii) establishing an explicitly assured and irrevocable line 
of credit from the Government to provide back-up funding to KDIC to improve its ability to make 
prompt depositor pay-outs and to provide financial assistance in times of crisis; (iii) discontinuing 
the current practice of allowing insolvent banks to continue to accept fresh deposits and repay 
existing deposits; and (iv) reviewing the processes involved to reduce the timelines allowed for 
making decisions on the repayment of depositors, providing financial assistance to and resolving 
troubled banks.  
78.      Korea established several funds in the wake of the GFC to provide financial assistance 
to financial institutions either directly or indirectly. Korea also established similar public fund 
during the crisis in the late 1990s. These funds can potentially distort the incentive framework for 
financial institutions, and their role should be reviewed carefully to fully address moral hazard issues.  
79.      The resolution framework for financial institutions in Korea provides a comprehensive 
range of resolution options but can be improved in light of FSB and BCBS recommendations. 
The legal framework establishes a special resolution regime for distressed financial institutions in 
Korea.24 While the resolution authorities’ powers are sufficiently comprehensive to address threats to 
financial stability, there is scope for improvement to assure certainty and avoid delays in resolution 
processes, particularly with reference to financial conglomerates and SIFIs, including cross-border 
operations. 
  
                                                   
24 The Act on Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry (ASIFI) provides the special resolution regime for 
financial sector entities, including banks (except the specialized banks), the Industrial Bank of Korea, investment 
traders, brokers, collective investment business entities, investment advisory business entities, discretionary 
investment business entities, insurance companies, mutual savings banks, trust business entities, merchant banks, 
and financial holding companies. 
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Appendix I. Korea: Main Recommendations of the  
2003 Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Main Recommendations Implementation Status 
Overall Financial Sector Oversight  
Strengthen supervisory independence to improve the 
ability to provide authoritative guidance and 
interpretation. 
 
Partly done. Several structural initiatives have 
been implemented to address independence. In 
practice more is to be done to preserve the FSC-
FSS independence from outside influence. 
Strengthen legal protection of supervisors. 
 
Partly done. Progress has been made, but more 
work is required to fully protect supervisors. 
Clarifying the division of responsibilities between the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE), the FSC and 
FSS. 
Done. 
Tighten supervision of NBDIs which face soundness 
problems and seem inadequately supervised. 
Partly done. Supervisory processes and 
regulations require continued attention. 
Banking Supervision  
Increase supervisor's capacity to meet the challenges of 
new tasks (i.e., off-balance sheet activities and Basel II). 
Done. 
Pay greater attention to differing risk levels when setting 
minimum capital levels, and give more attention to 
qualitative criteria in supervision. 
 
Partly done. Implementation of individual 
minimum capital ratios remains a work in 
progress and greater attention to qualitative 
criteria in offsite supervision needs attention.  
Broaden the coverage of fit and proper criteria. Done. 
Enhance the ability of supervisors to stress test banks' 
balance sheets. 
 
 
Partly done. Stress testing capabilities have 
improved. Further work is needed to integrate 
stress testing into the supervision cycle linked 
with assessing risk and capital management. 
Insurance Supervision  
Strengthen the solvency framework for life insurance 
companies, with most of the companies remaining 
undercapitalized. 
Done (new capital regime implemented, capital 
levels strengthened). 
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Securities Regulation  
Improve regulatory transparency, and strengthen 
enforcement of prudential rules. 
Partly done. 
Enhance the volatile market framework by requiring 
more frequent calculation and reporting of capital 
requirements. 
Partly done. 
Tighten regulations of securities firms to curb excessive 
risk-taking and mitigate derivatives activities related 
risks. 
Partly done. 
Payments System  
Establish the role of the Bank of Korea in overseeing the 
payments system in the legislation. 
Done, but powers of BOK need to be 
strengthened. 
Address existing obstacles related to settlement 
practices in debt securities trade, and mitigate risks 
associated the use of checks for large value payments. 
Done. 
Legal Framework  
Adopt a strong insolvency framework. Done. 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism 
 
More resources should be provided to the KoFIU to 
make the AML/CFT framework operational. 
Done, with a plan to increase resources to meet 
further needs. 
Remove the limitation to access customer information to 
facilitate international cooperation on information 
sharing. 
Done. 
Abolish the threshold for suspicious transaction reports. Amendment to enter into force in October 2013. 
Market Development  
Develop a benchmark yield curve; reduce market 
segmentation arising from multiple types of government 
securities. 
Partly done (duration extended to 30 years but 
different types of government bonds are still 
issued). 
Remove some remaining impediments to foreign 
participation to foster market development. 
Done. 
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Appendix II. Korea: Supervisory Intensity 
1.      The quality of financial sector supervision has emerged as a key issue from the 
financial crisis and while significant progress has been made in reforming regulatory 
standards for internationally active banks through the work of the BCBS, strengthening 
quality supervision should be seen as an equally important priority. To be effective in 
challenging institutions and ensuring adherence to regulations, supervision must include a number 
of key elements: it must be intrusive, adaptive, proactive, comprehensive, and conclusive.25 1/ 
Supervision intensity is characteristic of these key elements and represents not only the ability to 
act, but the demonstrated willingness of the supervisor to ask questions, dig deep and to act if 
issues are identified. The key purpose of this work-stream is to illustrate examples of best practice 
and identify potential areas of improvement if necessary. 
2.      The FSS adopts a two tiered approach to bank supervision: a focus on individual banks 
through a relationship manager model; and centralized teams of subject matter experts responsible 
for industry analysis of specific risk issues such as FX risk, concentration risk etc. The FSS maintains 
an integrated system to collect and manage data from the banks forming the basis of offsite 
surveillance. A comprehensive suite of Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) are collected on a 
quarterly basis and more regularly if required. For instance, in respect of liquidity, data are collected 
on a monthly basis. Results from offsite analysis are captured in the CAEL risk rating tool (Capital, 
Asset Soundness, Earnings and Liquidity). The offsite surveillance tools enable the FSS to identify 
risks and incorporate into its onsite supervision program that is adjusted if necessary.  
3.      A dedicated team of specialists perform onsite examinations across the banking 
sector. A full scope examination is normally performed every two years, encompassing a thorough 
evaluation of the entire spectrum of risk management and compliance programs. The onsite 
examination consists of a team of examiners and takes approximately one month and produces a 
risk assessment using the CAMEL-R framework (CAMEL-R is similar to CAEL with the addition of an 
assessment of Business Management and Risk Management). A partial onsite examination is 
normally performed every other year and is typically focused on a single thematic issue (e.g., 
corporate governance in 2012).  
4.      Onsite examinations complement off-sight supervision by providing insight into risk 
management as a forward-looking tool. Examples of best practice onsite examinations involve 
supervisors challenging the quality of risk management staff and being intrusive in evaluating the 
application of policies and processes, both of which are not evident in quantitative indicators. For 
example, the relationship between front and back office functions in the credit approval process, or 
the effectiveness of credit hind-sighting and risk culture. The onsite examination process conducted 
by the FSS is an intensive and in-depth examination involving meetings with senior management, 
Board representatives, file reviews, and analysis of key documentation and compares well with best 
                                                   
25 IMF Staff Position Note, “The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say No,” May 18, 2010. This document can 
be found at the following URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/createx/Publications.aspx?page=sdn . 
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practice in terms of its comprehensiveness. For the larger, more complex, and systemically important 
banks, greater frequency of onsite examinations would enable supervisors to act more proactively in 
detecting emerging risks and the capacity to adapt its supervisory stance accordingly.  
5.      Increasing the frequency of onsite examinations does, however, involve resource 
implications. An effective tool to differentiate the risk profile of banks will help allocate scarce 
supervisory resources against the riskiest banks and highest priority risks. Thematic examinations 
targeted at a specific portfolio or business line, conducted over a two-to-five day period, is one 
example of best practice to compare and contrast risk management practices to identify outliers 
across the industry. By making more use of deep-dive examinations that concentrate on a specific 
risk area, the FSS will be able to make more timely assessments of risk management and create a 
stronger linkage between onsite and offsite supervision. 
6.      In assessing corporate governance, the FSS onsite examination process includes the 
verification of documentation such as Board resolutions, Board minutes and meeting 
agendas, and an assessment of the adequacy of the management structure. In performing the 
full scope onsite examination, the FSS will meet with the Board to discuss risk management issues 
prior to, and at the conclusion of, the examination. The FSS will typically engage the executive 
directors during these meetings and only in exceptional circumstances will meet with the full board 
consisting of independent (outside) directors. A meeting with the full board of directors is seen as 
best practice as it will enable the supervisor the opportunity to effectively assess the board’s 
oversight of the bank by challenging its understanding of risk management processes and to ensure 
risk settings are prudently managed. A meeting with the full board will allow the FSS to more 
accurately assess the Board’s understand of the banking group’s operational structure and its risks, 
including those arising from the use of structures that impede transparency (e.g., special-purpose or 
related structures). Furthermore, by extending meetings with the board of directors of subsidiaries 
supervised by the FSC-FSS, will help ensure corporate governance standards are consistent across 
the group to protect different sets of stakeholders. 
7.      The nonbank deposit taking segment of the financial sector consists of a large number 
of individual institutions (approximately 2,338 Credit Unions, Cooperatives and 93 Mutual 
Savings Banks). As of March 2013, Credit Unions and Cooperatives had combined total assets of 
KW352.1tr representing 9.9 percent of the financial systems and KWR 10.7 percent of lending by the 
financial system with average assets of KWR 150.6 billion and average lending of KWR 87.4 billion. 
The largest Credit Union by assets is KWR 600 billion and the largest Cooperative is KWR 2 trillion 
which is in the Agricultural sector. The market share for Agricultural Cooperatives is almost 80 
percent at KWR 272.6 trillion. The FSC-FSS employs the same supervisory tools as used with banks 
(mainly CAEL and CAMEL), however for Credit Unions and Cooperatives, the FSS-FSC rely upon 
Federations representing their immediate membership to share the onsite and offsite supervision 
responsibilities. In the instance where nonbank deposit taking institutions are of a sufficiently 
significant size, there is scope to apply a consistent standard of minimum requirements across banks 
and nonbank deposit taking institutions.  
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8.      Since the Mutual Savings Bank crisis, the FSS-FSC have implemented a number of 
initiatives. The FSS has heavily increased the frequency of its onsite supervision of MSBs and passed 
changes to corporate governance requirements in an effort to raise standards. In addition, a number 
of MSBs have been forced to exit the industry. Offsite surveillance has been strengthened with the 
implementation of a loan examination support system where MSBs submit loan reports containing 
asset classification data on a monthly basis. It is anticipated that better data and stronger offsite 
analysis will enhance the ability of the FSS to identify risks and act in a pre-emptive manner. One 
important development that is yet to be implemented by the FSS in its supervision of the MSB 
sector, is a more frequent and intrusive approach to assessing the effectiveness of the Board.  
9.      The FSS-FSC boasts skilled staff and a strong commitment to their mandate. They 
operate with a detailed off-site supervisory process, supported by a broad range of financial 
soundness indicators that are reported in a timely manner. More frequent assessments of risk 
management information will complement established offsite supervision processes to produce a 
comprehensive view of risk. By applying an intrusive approach to the assessment of the board, and 
challenging it’s oversight of risk management, the FSS will be able to encourage higher standards of 
corporate governance essential to a resilient banking sector. 
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Appendix III. Korea: Risk Assessment Matrix26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                   
26 The risk assessment matrix shows events that could materially alter the baseline path—the scenario most likely to 
materialize in the view of the staff.  
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Appendix IV. Korea: Stress Test Matrix (STeM) for the  
Banking Sector (Solvency) 
Domain Assumptions 
Bottom-Up by Banks Top-Down by Authorities 
Institutions 
included 
 All nation-wide commercial banks (7).   All nation-wide commercial banks (7); all other 
commercial banks (on an aggregate basis). 
Market share  89 percent of commercial bank assets. 
 60 percent of banking sector assets. 
 40 percent of broad financial sector assets. 
 100 percent of assets of commercial banks. 
 
Data and 
baseline date 
 Banks’ internal data as of December 2012 
 Bank consolidated. 
 Bank-by-bank supervisory data as of December 2012. 
 Bank consolidated. 
Methodology  Banks’ internal models.   BOK’s model (SAMP). 
Stress test 
horizon 
 Five years up to December 2017.  Five years up to December 2017 (instantaneous for 
sensitivity test). 
Shocks Scenario analysis (all are macro scenarios, stressing asset prices and macroeconomic variables) 
 Baseline: April 2013 World Economic Outlook (WEO); real GDP growth rate is 2.8 ppt for 2013 and 3.9 
ppt for 2014.  
 A mild global double-dip: A GDP growth rate shock of 1 standard deviation (-3.3 ppts) from baseline in 
the first two years of a five-year horizon, with linear adjustment back to baseline in the third year. 
Growth rates at -0.5 percent (2013) and 0.6 percent (2014).  
 A severe global double-dip: A GDP growth rate shock of 2 standard deviation (-6.6 ppts) from baseline 
in the first two years of a five-year horizon, with linear adjustment back to baseline in the third and 
fourth years after the shock. Growth rates at -3.8 percent (2013) and -2.7 percent (2014). Standard 
deviations for both scenarios are based on 1990-2012 data.  
 Prolonged slowdown: A cumulative decline of real GDP by 1 standard deviation from baseline over 5 
years (-2.5 ppts/year). This shock is estimated based on the 5-year cumulative growth rate between 1990 
and 2012.  
 An increase in interest rates: A 250 bps cumulative increase of domestic interest rates over 2½ years, 
starting in the second half of 2014, as a result of the advanced countries’ potential exit from 
unconventional monetary policy. 
 Sensitivity Analysis (Single-factor analysis) 
 Interest rate-related credit risk: instantaneous impact 
of an interest rate spike (extreme shock: 300 bps; 
moderate: 200 bps). 
 Exchange rate depreciation (extreme shock: 
50 percent; moderate: 30 percent). 
 A fall in real house prices (extreme shock: 20 percent; 
moderate: 15 percent). 
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Domain Assumptions 
Bottom-Up by Banks Top-Down by Authorities 
Risks/factors 
assessed 
  
 Credit risk of loan portfolios by type of exposure (large corporations, SMEs, residential mortgage, credit 
cards, and others). 
 Market risk of trading and AFS securities, and off-balance sheet exposure.  
 All macro scenarios assess both credit and market risks.  
Risk factor 
assumptions 
 
 Credit losses are based on satellite models, using various macro/financial variables. 
 Profitability is based on satellite models, using various macro and bank-specific variables. 
 Mark-to-market valuation of trading and AFS securities. 
 Off-balance sheet positions are taken into account. 
   Contagion effects are incorporated through the 
channels of funding costs, credit crunch, and fire-sale 
of assets. 
Behavioral 
Adjustments 
 
 Net interest income estimated based on 
banks’ internal model.  
 Net interest income estimated based on the 
authorities’ model. 
 Balance sheet growth identical to projected credit growth 
 A constant share of non-loan assets in total assets based on average long-term growth. 
 Asset disposal not permitted. 
 Income composition assumed to remain constant. 
 Risk-weighted Assets (RWA) assumed to be adjusted in line with PDs (IRB approach). 
 Dividend payout ratio assumed to be zero if income is negative or capital falls below regulatory limit; 
else latest actual dividend payout ratio. 
Regulatory 
standards 
 RWAs as per Basel 2.5 and III. 
 Hurdle rate based on Basel III schedule. Relevant ratios include tier-1 and total capital ratio (8 percent). 
 Capital definition per Basel 2.5 and III. 
Reporting 
format to the 
FSAP team 
 Post-shock solvency ratios and losses by type 
of exposure (individual institutions). 
 Post-shock solvency ratios and losses by type of 
exposure (7 nation-wide banks individually, aggregate 
by type of institutions).  
Note: The authorities did not provide the supervisory data. The IMF team was unable to carry out independent stress 
tests due to the unavailability of sufficient publicly available data.  
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Appendix V. Korea: Stress Test Matrix (SteM) for the Banking  
Sector (Liquidity Risk) 
Domain Assumptions 
Bottom-Up by Banks Top-Down by Authorities 
Institutions 
included 
 All nation-wide commercial banks (7).   All nation-wide commercial banks (7); all other 
commercial banks (on an aggregate basis). 
Market share  89 percent of commercial bank assets. 
 60 percent of banking sector assets. 
 40 percent of broad financial sector assets. 
 100 percent of the assets of commercial banks.  
Data and 
baseline date 
 Internal bank data as of March 2013. An update of the FX liquidity tests was done by the authorities 
using data as of September 2013. 
 Bank consolidated. 
Risk factors  KRW and FX funding risk (deposit withdrawal and market freeze; uniform shocks across banks. 
independent of solvency tests). 
 Focus on access to funding, rather than funding cost.
Test horizon   30 days. 
Methodology  Cash flow analysis, based on internal models. 
 Withdrawal rates are applied to deposits, 
wholesale funding, derivatives, and committed 
credit lines.  
 Banks are assumed to be able to raise 
additional liquidity via the sale of 
unencumbered securities (with haircuts) and 
use of excess reserve deposits. 
 Implied cash flow analysis. 
 Stress tests incorporate wholesale funding 
difficulties and deposit withdrawals (funding 
risk), and fire sales of assets to meet liquidity 
constraints (market liquidity risk). Asset-specific 
haircuts are assumed. 
Shocks 
 
 The magnitude of the wholesale funding shocks is in line with the severe liquidity difficulties 
experienced by banks globally after the Lehman collapse. The deposit withdrawal rates are more 
severe than the historical experience in Korea. 
 Disruption of 100 percent of unsecured short-
term wholesale funding; 80 percent of secured 
wholesale funding (both KRW and FX); 
outflows of 20 percent of maturing retail term 
deposits (40 percent for FX), 40 percent of 
retail demand deposits (20 percent for FX), 
and 10 percent of committed credit lines (both 
KRW and FX). 
 Disruption of 100 percent of unsecured short-
term wholesale funding; 80 percent of secured 
wholesale funding (both KRW and FX); outflows 
of 6 percent of retail term deposits (30 percent 
for FX), and 40 percent of retail demand 
deposits (20 percent for FX). 
Assessment 
criteria 
 Maintaining no liquidity shortfall. 
 
Reporting 
format to the 
FSAP team 
 Liquidity shortfall, and inflows and outflows by type of funding (individual institutions); domestic 
and foreign currency separately. 
Note: The authorities did not provide the supervisory data. The IMF team was unable to carry out independent stress 
test due to the unavailability of publicly available data. 
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Appendix Figure 1. Korea: Banking Sector Soundness 
 
 
Sources: Financial Supervisory Service and IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2013. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Korea: Corporate Sector Risks 
 
 
Sources: IMF staff calculations; Bank of Korea; IMF, Corporate Vulnerability Utility; and Moody’s Analytics— 
CreditEdge Plus.  
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Appendix Figure 3. Korea: Household Sector Risks 
 
 
Sources: IMF staff estimates; BANK OF Korea, OECD; and Korea Institute of Finance based on the Household Survey of 
the Korea National Statistical Office and a framework provided by the IMF. 
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Appendix Figure 4. Korea: Top-Down Solvency Stress Test—  
Basel III Capital Ratios, Aggregate, and Distribution 
 
Source: Bank of Korea and IMF staff. 
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Appendix Figure 5. Korea: Top-down Solvency Stress Tests—Drivers of Cumulative Impact on 
Basel III Capital Adequacy Ratios 
 
 
Sources: Bank of Korea and IMF staff.  
 
Appendix Figure 6. Korea: Solvency Stress Tests— 
Impact of Market Risk in the Severe Scenario 
(In percent of risk-weighted assets) 
 
 
                                          Sources: Bank of Korea, Financial Supervisory Service, and IMF staff. 
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Appendix Figure 7. Korea: Basel III Capital Ratios after Sensitivity Shocks 
 
Sources: Bank of Korea and IMF staff. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 8. Korea: Liquidity Stress Tests—Breakdown of 30-Day Cash Flows 
 
 
Sources: Financial Supervisory Service and IMF staff.  
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Appendix Figure 9. Korea: Systemic Liquidity Indicators 
   
 
   
Sources: Bank of Korea and IMF staff. 
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Appendix Table 1. Korea: Selected Economic Indicators, 2008–14 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real GDP (percent change) 2.3 0.3 6.3 3.7 2.0 2.8 3.7
Total domestic demand 1.4 -2.7 6.2 2.0 1.0 2.0 2.7
Final domestic demand 0.8 0.6 4.5 1.4 1.1 2.2 2.8
Consumption 2.0 1.2 4.1 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.7
Gross fixed investment -1.9 -1.0 5.8 -1.0 -1.7 3.1 2.9
Net foreign balance 1/ 1.1 2.8 0.1 1.9 1.1 1.2 1.3
Nominal GDP (in trillions of won) 1,026.5 1,065.0 1,173.3 1,235.2 1,272.5 1,343.0 1,414.2
Saving and investment (in percent of GDP)
Gross national saving 31.6 30.2 32.4 31.8 31.8 32.3 32.0
Gross domestic investment 31.2 26.3 29.5 29.5 27.6 26.5 26.9
Current account balance 0.3 3.9 2.9 2.3 4.3 5.8 5.1
Prices (percent change)
CPI inflation (end of period) 4.1 2.8 3.0 4.2 1.4 1.0 2.5
CPI inflation (average) 4.7 2.8 2.9 4.0 2.2 1.1 1.8
Core inflation (average) 4.3 3.6 1.8 3.2 1.7 1.5 2.0
Real effective exchange rate -19.9 -12.4 11.4 0.6 1.1 … …
Trade (percent change)
Export volume 6.8 0.1 14.4 13.9 5.6 6.0 7.2
Import volume 0.9 -2.2 16.8 5.6 0.5 4.6 6.4
Terms of trade -14.4 10.8 -0.9 -8.2 2.5 2.2 -1.4
Consolidated central government (in percent of GDP)
Revenue 24.0 23.0 22.7 23.3 24.2 23.6 23.6
Expenditure 22.4 23.0 21.0 21.4 22.4 22.6 22.5
Net lending (+) / borrowing (-) 1.6 0.0 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.0 1.2
Overall balance 1.5 -1.7 1.4 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.9
Excluding Social Security Funds -1.1 -4.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.4 -2.1 -1.8
Money and credit (end of period)
Overnight call rate 2/ 3.0 2.0 2.5 3.3 2.8 2.5 …
Three-year AA- corporate bond yield 2/ 7.7 5.5 4.3 4.2 3.3 3.3 …
M3 growth 3/ 9.1 9.4 5.9 6.6 7.8 6.8 …
Balance of payments (in billions of  U.S. dollars)
Exports, f.o.b. 434.7 358.2 461.4 551.8 554.2 595.5 640.9
Imports, f.o.b. 429.5 320.3 421.4 520.1 514.4 533.3 577.8
Current account balance 3.2 32.8 29.4 26.1 48.1 69.5 65.3
Gross international reserves (end of period) 4/ 201.1 269.9 291.5 304.2 323.2 363.3 385.3
In percent of short-term debt (residual maturity) 111.7 146.2 162.5 165.0 181.2 214.4 220.0
External debt (in billions of  U.S. dollars)
Total external debt (end of period) 317.4 345.7 359.8 398.7 409.4 427.1 453.8
Total external debt (in percent of GDP) 34.1 41.4 35.4 35.8 36.2 35.3 35.4
Debt service ratio 5/ 7.9 7.8 6.8 6.4 7.5 7.5 7.8
Real effective exchange rate (level) 85.7 75.8 82.1 82.2 82.0 … …
Sources:  Korean authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
1/ Contribution to GDP growth.
2/ Data for 2013 are as of November 4, 2013.
3/ Data for 2013 are as of August.
4/ Excludes gold.
5/ Debt service on medium- and long-term debt in percent of exports of goods and services.
Projections
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Appendix Table 2. Korea: Financial System Structure, 2002–12 
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Appendix Table 3 Korea: Core Set of Financial Soundness Indicators, 2008–12 
(In percent) 
 
 
